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Authorities have been 
seeking ways to capture 
the information that dark 
networks share through 
social media.
Contemplating the Future of Social Media, Dark Networks, and 
Counterinsurgency1
STATE OF THE ART
“We use Facebook to schedule the protests, Twitter to coordi-
nate, and YouTube to tell the world.”
 —Cairo activist, Egyptian Arab Spring²
The spectacular growth in social media over the last decade, 
led by Facebook, YouTube, and Twitter, and their potential usefulness have 
not been lost on insurgents and others using what we call dark networks.³ 
Over the last few years, such groups have increasingly turned to social media 
to communicate with and motivate their followers and supporters. For 
example, the use of social media by Egyptian insurgents during the Arab 
Spring is well documented,4 and other dark networks, such as the FARC 
(Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia—Revolutionary Armed Forces 
of Colombia) and the Free Syrian Army (FSA), have attempted to exploit 
their functionality as well. At the same time, authorities have been seeking 
ways to capture the information that dark networks share through social 
media. To date their efforts have yielded minimal returns, but there is good 
reason to believe that this could change in the future.
Speculating about the future is almost always a tenuous endeavor, and 
contemplating the interplay of social media, dark networks, and counterin-
surgents is no exception. I’ll limit myself here to discussing three of many 
possible scenarios: the use of social media by insurgents to communicate 
and disseminate information; social media’s value for authorities who track 
and disrupt dark networks; and the ways both insurgents and authorities use 
social media to frame and reframe discontent.
Communication and Diffusion
Scholars have long highlighted the importance that communication net-
works play in the mobilization of insurgencies and other social movements. 
“For example, the communication channels that were long embedded in 
African American churches and historically black colleges were employed to 
help coordinate communications in the black civil rights movement of the 
1950s and ‘60s;” more recently scholars have noted that the internet, satellite 
broadcasting, and cell phone technologies “have helped to mobilize and 
sustain various uprisings, protests, and insurgencies since the 1990s.”5 Thus, 
it is not surprising that contemporary insurgencies, such as the FARC and the 
FSA, have turned to social media to help mobilize members and supporters. 
The FARC and some individual members have their own websites, while the 
group’s commander, Timoleon Jimenez, a relative newcomer to the world 
of social media, recently issued a series of tweets attacking the Colombian 
government, less than two weeks before peace talks were to begin.6 Similarly, 
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the FSA operates two Facebook accounts on which it posts information 
concerning its military operations; it also uses Twitter and YouTube to com-
municate with and disseminate videos to its followers.7
How insurgents and other groups use these media in the future will hinge, 
of course, on how social media evolve. It is a reasonable assumption that 
the platforms will only get faster, easier, and less expensive, making them 
even more attractive to insurgents. We can also be reasonably confident that 
insurgencies and other dark networks will attempt to remain on or close to 
the technological cutting edge.
That said, given how easy it is to track the posts, tweets, and video uploads 
of insurgent groups, it is surprising that they are so open about what they are 
doing and with whom they communicate. Moreover, one would expect that 
counterinsurgents would attempt to use such information to their advantage. 
For example, it seems logical that the Assad regime would regularly monitor 
the FSA’s online activity, since the information contained therein might 
offer them a strategic advantage in their efforts to better counter the FSA’s 
operations. It appears, however, that either the regime is unaware of the FSA’s 
use of social media, or it lacks the technological sophistication needed for 
monitoring the FSA’s activities in a timely manner. What this suggests is that 
until counterinsurgents develop the tools necessary to track how insurgents 
use social media, dark networks will continue to have the advantage.
Tracking and Disrupting
That the Assad regime appears unable to track the FSA’s on-line activities 
does not mean that others cannot or are not doing so, however. For example, 
the New York Police Department (NYPD) became aware that newer gangs are 
using social media to boast of their exploits and taunt rival gangs, and there-
fore have been able to monitor the gangs’ activities. “By capitalizing on the 
irresistible urge of these suspects to brag about their murderous exploits on 
Facebook, detectives used social media to draw a virtual map of their criminal 
activity over the last three years.”8 In fact, by monitoring the conversations 
and trash talk between two rival gangs on Facebook, the NYPD was able to 
arrest 49 gang members on homicide and other criminal charges.9 
What this suggests is that by tracking social media posts and uploads, 
not only can authorities be alerted to significant events and uncover self-
identified perpetrators, but they can also identify key members through the 
use of analytical methods such as social network analysis.¹0 For example, as 
my colleagues and I discuss in our article “Mining Twitter Data from the 
Arab Spring” (in this issue), network data culled from publicly available 
micro-blogging tools such as Twitter can help analysts and operators identify 
individuals worth tracking, and ideally improve knowledge of the network. 
This kind of knowledge is essential to improve the crafting of disruption 
strategies over time:
In the successful strikes against al Qaeda affiliates in Singapore, 
Morocco, and Saharan Africa, the key doctrinal approach was to 
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wait and watch for a considerable period, then to swarm the targets 
simultaneously at their moment of maximum illumination. This 
strategic patience grew out of the understanding that striking at 
nodes as they were identified might actually reduce the ability to 
detect and track other cells in the networks in question. It is a curious 
fact [that]… the more that is disrupted, the less may be known.¹¹
Using social media to track and ultimately disrupt dark networks will, of 
course, turn on the ability to scrape social media data in near real-time. 
While techniques for doing so are in their infancy, analysts, for example, 
recently developed a program (NodeXL) designed for pulling network data 
from social media sites such as Facebook, Twitter, Wikipedia, YouTube, 
and so on.¹² More recently, Russell Shepherd and Patrick Dudas helped the 
Defense Analysis Department’s CORE Lab at the Naval Postgraduate School 
create a tool for gathering publicly available Twitter posts in near real-time. 
The Lab recently used this tool to track the social media use of the FARC, the 
FSA, the Taliban, the Omari Battalion, and others dark networks, as well as 
anti-regime protesters in Egypt.
It is hard to imagine that insurgencies and other clandestine actors would 
continue to use social media if counterinsurgent analysts become increas-
ingly adept at tracking their movements and mapping their interactions. We 
can be sure, however, that the social media market will continue to evolve, 
and that current major players such as Facebook, Twitter, and YouTube may 
give way in turn to new sites that are easier and more convenient to use. 
It is also highly likely that insurgencies will turn to these newer media as 
counterinsurgents get a handle on older ones. Thus, it is possible to imagine 
a scenario where insurgents, or at least the successful ones, will stay one step 
ahead in the exploitation of social media functionality.
Framing and Reframing
Scholars have noted that discontent by itself does not produce insurgencies. 
To take action, people must believe that change is not only necessary but 
also possible. They need to be able to perceive, interpret, and explain a situ-
ation in such a way that compels them to mobilize.¹³ This is most effectively 
accomplished by budding insurgencies when they frame their core message 
in ideological snippets that resonate with their target audience.¹4 As we 
describe in our article on Egypt’s Arab Spring, it is easy to see the potential 
role that tools such as Twitter, with its 140-character limit on tweets, can 
play in the framing of grievances by insurgencies. A report published by the 
Project on Information Technology and Political Islam at the University 
of Washington concluded that social media played a role in framing the 
Arab Spring in three major ways: by shaping political debates, by spreading 
democratic ideas, and by facilitating online “revolutionary conversations” 
that often preceded major events on the ground.¹5
What has received less attention is the ways in which authorities can use 
social media to reframe discontent so that it is redirected in more benign 
directions. An example of the potential for reframing was recently illustrated 
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by a Twitter conversation in response to a Newsweek cover that featured two 
men with fists in the air under the headline, “Muslim Rage.”¹6 In an effort 
to promote a conversation about the cover story, which concerned riots that 
broke out in response to a film clip posted to YouTube lampooning Islam, 
Newsweek asked its readers to tweet their thoughts. What it got in response 
was an onslaught of comments that mocked both the Newsweek story and 
the Islamic rioters in the Middle East. One reader captured the general 
sentiment:
I think it was this unspoken communal desire to reclaim the 
initiative, not just from what was regarded as kind of a cynical 
and inflammatory cover from Newsweek, but also just from a 
terrible, terrible week. I mean, it had been a really disillusioning 
week, seeing the way that this movie was responded to in Muslim 
countries in the Middle East. Even if it was only a thousand 
people here and a thousand people there, seeing people take the 
bait so easily was depressing … I think for a lot of people it sort 
of restored their faith in the community, because, honestly, this 
should have been the response to this movie from the very start. 
It should have been mocked and then ignored (emphasis added).¹7
The dampening effect, if any, that these tweets may have had on the riots in 
the Middle East is difficult to determine, but they illustrate the potential of 
how social media tools, such as Twitter, can be harnessed to reframe discon-
tent, so that rather than resorting to violence, people can express their anger 
in public dialogue.¹8
Not only can social media be used to reframe discontent, however, they can 
be used to turn public opinion against popular insurgent movements as well. 
For example, Óscar Morales, a Colombian civil engineer, grew increasingly 
frustrated by the FARC’s human-rights abuses, so in 2008 he set up a Face-
book page called “One Million Voices Against the FARC,” whose motto was 
“No more kidnappings, No more lies, No more killings, No more FARC.”¹9 
His campaign not only helped attract attention to the insurgents’ indiscrimi-
nate use of violence, but it led to worldwide protests against the FARC.²0 
Some analysts are beginning to imagine how social media can be used to 
alienate insurgent groups and other dark networks from the wider popula-
tion, a key aspect of counterinsurgency theory.²¹
Whither the Future?
So what can we say about how insurgents and authorities will attempt to 
capitalize on social media tools to further their goals? I think it is relatively 
safe to conclude that insurgents will continue to turn to social media to 
communicate and frame grievances, and if the past is any indication of the 
future, they will become increasingly sophisticated in doing so. This will 
place a heavy burden on those of us who seek to disrupt dark networks, to 
keep abreast of the latest social media developments. It is fairly certain that 
as we become more adept at tracking the movements of insurgents, terrorists, 
criminals, and others from information gleaned from social media outlets, 
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these actors will abandon old technologies in favor of new ones. The rewards 
for attaining and maintaining a high level of technological sophistication 
in the use of social media are high. The costs for not doing so may be even 
higher.   
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